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The discovery of von Economo neurons within macaque insular cortex by Evrard et al. (2012) described in
this issue of Neuron promises a valuable experimental model to characterize their functional roles. One
hypothesis, now open to wider interrogation, is that these intriguing cells mediate self-referential processes
underlying or dependent upon consciousness awareness.Von Economo neurons (VENs) enjoy
an (often unspoken) reputation as a
potential neural correlate of conscious-
ness and its expression within complex
social behaviors. Comparative neuro-
anatomy underlies these ambitious
claims: VENs were found initially only in
humans and hominid primates (i.e.,
gorilla, chimpanzee, orangutan) and
were thought to be absent in gibbons,
monkeys, prosimians and other species
(Nimchinsky et al., 1999; Allman et al.,
2011). Highest VEN density is found in
the human brain and, across the great
apes, VEN densities appear distributed
in a manner seemingly proportionate
with human-like social cognitive abilities.
In hominids, the localization of VENs
within anterior cingulate and anterior
insular cortices also suggests that
VENs may underpin the contribution of
these regions to aspects of human
conscious awareness, including higher-
order thought and emotional feeling
states. VENs are large projection neurons,
a feature consistent with a role in ‘‘work-
space’’ functional architectures pro-
posed to underlie conscious access
generally (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011).
However, detailed characterization of
VENs in terms of neurophysiology (what
information is processed) and con-
nectivity (where this information goes)
has so far been unavailable. The obser-
vation of VENs in the macaque brain
(Evrard et al., 2012) therefore opens
an accessible route for much-needed
detailed functional characterization of
these distinctive projection neurons.At the same time, the discovery
also prompts a revision of assumptions
regarding the phylogenetic emergence
of VENs and their association with large
brain size. Although previously sought in
macaque brains (e.g., Nimchinsky et al.,
1999; Butti and Hof, 2010), the presence
of VENs in a discrete agranular region of
macaque anterior insula has only just
come to light through advanced micro-
scopic methods and dense sampling of
cortical sections. Beyond hominid
primates, VENs have now been observed
in the insula of a subset of mammalian
species including elephant, whale,
dolphin, walrus, and manatee. All these
animals have large brains, ‘‘complex
sociality,’’ and gravitational or aquatic
demands on their autonomic physiology
(Butti and Hof, 2010). There is a danger
perhaps of reading too much into these
wider associations, e.g., VENs are also
observed in the common zebra. Never-
theless, understanding how VENs
contribute to cognitive and behavioral
functions relevant to human health and
illness so far has been limited by the
absence of an applicable experimental
model.
Evrard et al. (2012) examined the brains
of two species of macaque, rhesus
and cynomolgus, which are the most
commonly studied old-world monkeys
in experimental settings. A combination
of Nissl staining with cresyl violet and
immunohistochemistry was used to
identify neuronal types including VENs,
which are characterized by having an
elongated cell body, long and thick apicalNeurondendrites with narrow lateral extension,
and a single basal dendrite (Watson
et al., 2006; Nimchinsky et al., 1999;
Seeley et al., 2012). Macaque VENs
were identified by this distinctive mor-
phology among typical pyramidal cells in
cortical layer 5b. Other feature criteria,
such as a lack of dendritic branching
on Golgi stain, increased their specific
identification. Importantly, Evrard et al.
(2012) were rigorous in demonstrating
through a combination of methods that
the cells were not misidentifed large
inhibitory interneurons. Notably, by virtue
of the brains having been previously
used in tract-tracing studies, some of
the VENs (in four monkeys) happened
to have been retrogradely labeled from
other regions with cholera toxin or a fluo-
rescent dye, confirming them as projec-
tion neurons. In addition, the researchers
were able also to refer to sections of
a human brain stained with cresyl violet.
Macaque VENs were seen in a small
region of agranular insular cortex of both
species (alongside a related neuron
type, fork cells). In smaller numbers,
VENs were also observed in anterior
cingulate cortex and parts of ventral and
medial prefrontal cortex. Cells were
counted with high-resolution optical
dissection and fractionation. VEN densi-
ties were in general less than those
seen in great apes and humans, repre-
senting up to 3% of layer 5 neurons.
Interestingly, macaque VENs share with
human VENs immunopositivity for pro-
teins associated with psychiatric disor-
ders and/or autonomic control. These74, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 423
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(DISC-1), the serotonin receptor 5ht2br,
and the dopamine D3 receptor.
The structure and size of VENs,
including the long and thick basal and
apical dendrites, indicates a role in
relaying the outputs of cortical columns
(Watson et al., 2006) and long-range inter-
regional communication (Nimchinsky
et al., 1999), a view that is supported
by observed reductions of human VEN
numbers in agenesis of corpus callosum
and frontotemporal dementia. Corre-
spondingly, hominid VEN-containing
brain regions show enhanced con-
nectivity with frontotemporal regions
including prefrontal cortex, amygdala,
and septum (Allman et al., 2011) and
contribute to functional networks impli-
cated in salience detection, attention,
and sensorimotor control (Cauda et al.,
2012). Interestingly, Evrard et al. (2012)
draw attention to circumstantial evidence
and preliminary tract-tracing data sug-
gesting that the projection targets of
VENs may be distinct from those of other
neurons within anterior insula (and ante-
rior cingulate). Rather, VENs may have
longer projections: Evrard et al. (2012)
give evidence for sparse connectivity to
anterior cingulate and contralateral insula,
yet speculate a greater concentration of
projections to brainstem targets includ-
ing periaqueductal gray (PAG) and para-
brachial nucleus (PBN). These structures
are proximally involved in the efferent
control of the internal state of the body
through the autonomic nervous system
and in its afferent visceral sensory
mapping, i.e., interoception (the sense of
internal physiological state). Interoceptive
pathways can be distinguished from
those of other sensory modalities and
have a primary cortical mapping within
insula. Interoceptive information is further
integrated with other representations
within anterior insula (perhaps particularly
in the right hemisphere), resulting in
an enriched encoding of motivational
salience. Importantly, human anterior
insula cortex appears to support con-
scious access to both the interoceptive
information and associated integrated
representations of how encoded objects
and concepts relate to the (biological)
self (Singer et al., 2009; Craig, 2011).
In von Economo’s description of VENs
as rod or corkscrew cells, he recognized424 Neuron 74, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevierthe association between the VEN-con-
taining regions (anterior insular and cingu-
late cortices) and autonomic function,
speculating ‘‘a cerebral representation of
the autonomic or sympathetic nervous
systems in particular areas of the insula’’
(Seeley et al., 2012). A link to the control
of internal state and associated motiva-
tions is also indicated by biochemical
study of human VENs demonstrating the
presence of proteins linked to control of
digestion, ‘‘stress,’’ pain, and immune
reactions (Allman et al., 2011). The lateral-
ized preponderance of VENs within right
insula (Allman et al., 2011; Evrard et al.,
2012) is also arguably suggestive of a
role in interoceptive representation (Craig,
2011). Evrard et al. (2012) propose that
VENs may contribute to interoception
by providing inhibitory feedback from in-
sula presumably to earlier (brainstem)
levels of interoceptive representation.
This notion is not dissimilar from our
hypothesis that ‘‘interoceptive predictive
coding’’ underpins integrative processing
necessary for self-representation that ulti-
mately supports conscious awareness
(Seth et al., 2011).
An influential concept emphasizes the
importance of internal states of arousal
as the origin of feelings and the primary
reference for a continued sense of self
(e.g., Damasio, 2010). While this notion is
embedded within modern expressions
of the James-Lange theory, its origin
within the Western tradition perhaps
dates back to Aristotle. Aligned with this
notion, insular cortex supports a neural
representation of changes in internal
arousal states, and, within anterior insular
cortex, the re-representation of this infor-
mation is proposed to underlie subjective
emotional feelings and their abstraction
to both the encoding of future risk and
the experience of empathic feeling for
others (Singer et al., 2009; Craig, 2011).
The mechanics of how these processes
might be implemented have been rather
more elusive. However, a maturing
understanding of the brain as a hypoth-
esis-testing or ‘‘Bayesian’’ machine, as
first formulated by von Helmholtz and as
more recently expressedwithin the frame-
work of predictive coding or ‘‘free energy
minimization’’ (Friston, 2010), are making
such questions increasingly tractable.
Von Helmholtz conceived of perception
as a process of inference on the causes ofInc.sensory input. This process is, however,
confronted by the ambiguities arising
from the many-to-many relations
between sensory signals and their poten-
tial causes (i.e., a particular sensory input
could have many different causes, and
a particular cause in the world could
have many different sensory effects).
The predictive coding framework
addresses this challenge by proposing
that the brain maintains hypotheses
(‘‘generative models’’) of the causes of
sensory input. These models furnish pre-
dicted inputs, which are compared with
actual sensory input, with mismatches
(‘‘prediction errors’’) being used to update
the generative models in an iterative,
never-ending process of prediction error
minimization following the principles of
Bayes (Friston, 2010). Applied to sensory
perception mediated by cortical hierar-
chies, bottom-up signals originating in
sense data are suggested to convey
prediction errors, while top-down signals
specify the content of the generative
models determining perceptual content;
predictions are generated and compared
at multiple cortical levels via hierarchical
Bayesian inference. We have recently
suggested that a similar principle might
also apply to interoception, wherein
subjective feeling states arise from
predictive inferences on the causes of
interoceptive signals (Seth et al., 2011;
see Figure 1). This ‘‘interoceptive predic-
tive coding’’ model is compatible with
James-Lange inasmuch as feelings are
understood to arise from perceptions of
physiological changes; it also generalizes
to so-called two-factor theories of
emotion, which have long recognized
that subjective feelings can be influenced
by cognitively explicit beliefs about the
causes of physiological changes. Accord-
ing to this model, hierarchical Bayesian
modeling of the internal state of the
body presents a possible mechanism for
self-representation through subjective
feeling states. Importantly, the integrity
of such a representation depends on
efficiency of the predictive model, a
process to which VENs may be critical.
In humans, the anterior insular cortex
provides a natural locus for comparator
mechanisms underlying interoceptive
predictive coding, as indicated by its
demonstrated importance for interocep-
tive representation and observations of
Figure 1. A Possible Functional Architecture to which VENs Contribute in an Interoceptive
Predictive Coding Model of Self
In this model, subjective feeling states are constituted by continually updated predictions of the causes
of interoceptive input. In close analogy with predictive coding models of sensory perception, these pre-
dictions are shaped by generative models informed by ‘‘efference copies’’ of visceral, autonomic, and
motor control signals. Predictions are generated, compared, and updated within a salience network
anchored on the anterior insular and anterior cingulate corticeswith engagement also of brainstem regions
including periaqueductal gray (PAG) matter and parabrachial nucleus (PBN) as targets for visceromotor
control and relays of afferent interoceptive signals. Self-consciousness is grounded on the feeling states
that emerge from interaction of interoceptive predictions and prediction errors. In this context, VEN pop-
ulations within the salience network, including its subcortical nodes in the PAG and PBN, would enable
efficient registration of afferent and efferent signals during the generation and evaluation of interoceptive
predictions, thereby enhancing the integrity of self-representation. The discovery of Evrard et al. (2012)
opens the possibility of more precise specification and localization of the role of VENs in this model or
its successors. Adapted from (Seth et al., 2011).
Neuron
Previewsreward-related prediction error signals in
a variety of contexts (Seth et al., 2011;
Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2012; Singer
et al., 2009). Fast VEN-mediated connec-
tions within the salience network incorpo-
rating ‘‘visceromotor’’ anterior cingulate
cortex would allow the swift updating of
generative models, supported by efficient
transmission and registration of viscero-
motor and viscerosensory signals to and
from subcortical nodes in the PBN and
PAG. While so far these connections
remain speculative (Craig, 2011), the
discovery of Evrard et al. (2012) now
renders their presence experimentally
testable. More prospectively, examining
neurophysiological responses of VENs
could reveal explicit prediction error
signals, a key test for all predictive coding
frameworks and again one that may
be enabled by a relevant experimental
model.
Evrard et al. (2012) themselves note
potential implications of their findings for
understanding consciousness, focusing
on self-consciousness and social aware-
ness. This focus aligns with evidence
implicating hominid anterior insular cortex
in extended forms of self-awareness in
both individuals and social contexts
(Singer et al., 2009). A challenge to thisview is that macaques do not appear
to pass standard mirror tests for self-
recognition, at least not reliably. However,
it is plausible that the phylogenetic
development of VEN-mediated salience
networks, originating from pressure for
more efficient homeostatic control, has
led to a spectrum of self-consciousness.
These representations would share
fundamentally a ‘‘minimal self-hood’’
through biological integrity, but they
would build from this all the way to social
expressions of self-hood that incorporate
intersubjective predictions of emotional
responses. This view is consistent with
the greater concentrations (and size) of
VENs in hominids as compared to
macaques and remains compatible with
notions of interoceptive predictive
coding. A related hypothesis is that
VENs may mediate a ‘‘global workspace’’
functional architecture (Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011), still anchored on intero-
ceptive and emotional signaling, by virtue
of providing fast functional connections
between salience hubs in insular and
cingulate cortices to widely separated
brain areas.
Most psychiatric disorders impact
upon the integrity of self-representation.
This impact can be expressed at multipleNeuronlevels including, for example, the vegeta-
tive and motivational symptoms that
accompany social withdrawal and self-
critical cognitions in depression, the
visceral arousal and exaggerated self-
reference in anxiety disorders, or the
perceptual distortions that accompany
aberrant reality testing in psychosis.
Correspondingly, dysfunction of anterior
insular cortex is linked to social deficits,
anxiety states, and the expression of
dissociative and psychotic symptoms.
It is perhaps psychosis, particularly
schizophrenia, that most typifies a core
disturbance of self-consciousness in
awake attentive individuals (Fletcher and
Frith, 2009; Palaniyappan and Liddle,
2012). While other psychiatric symptoms
involving anterior insula dysfunction
might involve disordered prediction
(Singer et al., 2009; Seth et al., 2011),
schizophrenia is perhaps most open to
understanding in terms of dysfunctional
predictive mechanisms (Fletcher and
Frith, 2009). As mentioned, human VENs
express proteins (notably DISC-1) linked
to schizophrenia, and VEN density (in
anterior cingulate) is linked to illness
duration and completed suicide in
psychotic patients (Allman et al., 2011).
A developed macaque experimental
model of neural substrates for conscious-
ness grounded in the anterior insula
cortex may thus provide a unique and
much-needed avenue into pathophysi-
ology of psychiatric disorders, especially
schizophrenia.
Evrard et al. (2012)’s important
discovery naturally raises the question of
how broadly VENs might be distributed
across animal species that have ex-
perimental relevance. Just as their pres-
ence in macaque anterior insula opens
substantial new experimental opportu-
nities specific to this animal, should
further investigations uncover VENs or
similar neurons in animals such as rats
or even mice, yet more opportunities
would emerge. For example, optogenetic
manipulation of VEN expression and
activity could potentially provide elegant
experimental insight into VEN contri-
butions to cognitive representations
and behavior. The characterization of
VENs is likely to benefit also from the
acceleration in the application of
other genetic experimental approaches
(including gene knockout and knockin74, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 425
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Previewsrodent studies) to neuroscience. A door
has been opened by Evrard et al. (2012),
but much exciting work remains to be
done.
REFERENCES
Allman, J.M., Tetreault, N.A., Hakeem, A.Y., and
Park, S. (2011). Am. J. Hum. Biol. 23, 5–21.
Butti, C., and Hof, P.R. (2010). Brain Struct. Funct.
214, 477–493.
Cauda, F., Torta, D.M., Sacco, K., D’Agata, F.,
Geda, E., Duca, S., Geminiani, G., and Vercelli, A.
(2012). Brain Struct. Funct., in press. Published
online January 29, 2012. 10.1007/s00429-012-
0382-9.426 Neuron 74, May 10, 2012 ª2012 ElsevierCraig, A.D. (2011). Ann. N Y Acad. Sci. 1225,
72–82.
Damasio, A.R. (2010). Self Comes to Mind:
Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York:
Pantheon).
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J.P. (2011). Neuron
70, 200–227.
Evrard, H., Forro, T., and Logothetis, N. (2012).
Neuron 74, this issue, 482–489.
Fletcher, P.C., and Frith, C.D. (2009). Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 10, 48–58.
Friston, K. (2010). Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 11, 127–138.Inc.Nimchinsky, E.A., Gilissen, E., Allman, J.M., Perl,
D.P., Erwin, J.M., and Hof, P.R. (1999). Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 5268–5273.
Palaniyappan, L., and Liddle, P.F. (2012). J.
Psychiatry Neurosci. 37, 17–27.
Seeley, W.W., Merkle, F.T., Gaus, S.E., Craig, A.D.,
Allman, J.M., Hof, P.R., and Economo, C.V. (2012).
Cereb. Cortex 22, 245–250.
Seth, A.K., Suzuki, K., and Critchley, H.D. (2011).
Front. Psychol. 2, 395.
Singer, T., Critchley, H.D., and Preuschoff, K.
(2009). Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 13, 334–340.
Watson, K.K., Jones, T.K., and Allman, J.M. (2006).
Neuroscience 141, 1107–1112.2B or Not 2B: A Tail of Two NMDA Receptor SubunitsCarlos Cepeda1 and Michael S. Levine1,*
1Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Research Center, Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior, Brain Research
Institute, The David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
*Correspondence: mlevine@mednet.ucla.edu
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.011
N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor activation can be neuroprotective or neurotoxic depending on
receptor location. In this issue of Neuron, Martel et al. (2012) demonstrate that the C-terminal of NMDA
receptor subunits also contributes critically to excitotoxicity. NMDA receptor subunits containing the GluN2B
C-terminal are more lethal than those containing the GluN2A tails, regardless of location.Is the location of N-methyl-D-aspartate
receptors (NMDARs) at synaptic or extra-
synaptic sites the only, or even the
primary, determinant of neuroprotective
or neurotoxic effects of glutamate? While
we thought this question had been
settled, at least partially (Levine et al.,
2010; Milnerwood et al., 2010; Okamoto
et al., 2009), newwork from the laboratory
that raised into prominence the differen-
tial role of synaptic and extrasynaptic
NMDARs and gave us a better under-
standing of the intracellular cascades
that lead to excitotoxicity (Hardingham
et al., 2002) now demonstrates that we
were missing part of the equation, a little
but important C-tail. In effect, the
C-terminal domain (CTD) of the NMDAR
subunit appears to play a critical role in
the function of the receptor.
In an elegant study published in this
issue ofNeuron, Martel et al. (2012) reportthat the activation of proapoptotic
cascades is determined not just by the
location of the NMDAR, but also by the
identity of the CTD. As pharmacological
approaches commonly used to differen-
tiate the two subunits are limited at best,
the authors used genetic manipulations
to engender chimeric receptors in which
only the CTD from GluN2A and GluN2B
receptor subunits is C-terminal replaced
(CTR). Why focus on the CTD? It has
been shown that the CTD of NMDAR
subunits is the primary area of sequence
divergence, and it is the site that primarily
binds scaffolding proteins, providing
a strong rationale for examining its role
in excitotoxicity.
In the first series of experiments,
expression of chimeric GluN2B2A(CTR)
receptors in transfected hippocampal
neurons produced similar currents as
wild-type (WT) subunits (GluN2BWT) anddid not affect the proportion of synaptic
and extrasynaptic receptors, thus pre-
venting potential confounds arising from
receptor location. Interestingly, NMDA-
induced cell death was reduced in
chimeric GluN2B2A(CTR) compared to
GluN2BWT-containing receptors, sug-
gesting that excitotoxicity is better
promoted by CTD2B than CTD2A. Simi-
larly, neurons expressing GluN2A2B(CTR)
were more susceptible to cell death than
neurons expressing GluN2AWT (Figure 1).
Using a different approach, a knockin
mouse was generated in which the
protein-coding region of the C-terminal
exon of the GluN2B subunit was
exchanged for that of theGluN2A subunit,
named GluN2B2A(CTR)/2A(CTR). Cultured
cortical neurons from these mice dis-
played similar levels of viability, synaptic
connectivity, proportion of extrasynaptic
NMDARs, sensitivity to ifenprodil,
